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Abstract
With the emergence of cross-organization attack-prone byzan-
tine fault-tolerant (BFT) systems, so-called Blockchains, pro-
viding asynchronous state machine replication (SMR) solu-
tions is no longer a theoretical concern. This paper introduces
ACE: a general framework for the software design of fault-
tolerant SMR systems. We first propose a new leader-based-
view (LBV) abstraction that encapsulates the core properties
provided by each view in a partially synchronous consensus
algorithm, designed according to the leader-based view-by-
view paradigm (e.g., PBFT and Paxos). Then, we compose
several LBV instances in a non-trivial way in order to boost
asynchronous liveness of existing SMR solutions.
ACE is model agnostic – it abstracts away any model as-
sumptions that consensus protocols may have, e.g., the ratio
and types of faulty parties. For example, when the LBV ab-
straction is instantiated with a partially synchronous consen-
sus algorithm designed to tolerate crash failures, e.g., Paxos
or Raft, ACE yields an asynchronous SMR for n = 2f + 1
parties. However, if the LBV abstraction is instantiated with
a byzantine protocol like PBFT or HotStuff, then ACE yields
an asynchronous byzantine SMR for n = 3f + 1 parties.
To demonstrate the power of ACE, we implement it in C++,
instantiate the LBV abstraction with a view implementation
of HotStuff – a state of the art partially synchronous byzantine
agreement protocol – and compare it with the base HotStuff
implementation under different adversarial scenarios. Our
evaluation shows that while ACE is outperformed by HotStuff
in the optimistic, synchronous, failure-free case, ACE has
absolute superiority during network asynchrony and attacks.
Keywords asynchronous SMR, abstractions, composition
1 Introduction
In practice, building reliable systems via state machine repli-
cation (SMR) requires resilience against all network condi-
tions, including malicious attacks. The best way to model
such settings is by assuming asynchronous communication
links. However, due to the FLP result [29], deterministic asyn-
chronous SMR solutions are impossible.
Two principal approaches are used to circumvent this re-
sult. The first is by assuming partial synchrony [28], in which
protocols are designed to guarantee safety under worst case
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network conditions, but are able to satisfy progress only dur-
ing “long enough” periods of network synchrony. The vast
majority of the protocols in this model follow the leader-based
view-by-view paradigm due to their speed during synchro-
nous attack-free network periods, and their relative simplicity.
In fact, most deployed systems, several of which have be-
come the de facto standards for building reliable systems (e.g.,
Paxos [37], PBFT [21] and others [2, 5, 15, 48, 54]), adopt
this approach. The drawback of the partial synchrony model
is fact that it fails to capture mobile networks attacks [52],
leaving the leader-based view-by-view algorithms vulnerable.
For example, an attacker can prevent progress by adaptively
blocking the communication of one party (the leader of the
current view) at a time.
The second approach to circumvents the FLP impossibility
is by employing randomization [14, 50]. The most commonly
used strategy is to always satisfy safety properties, but relax-
ing liveness to guarantee eventual progress with probability
approaching 1 under all network conditions. Potentially, proto-
cols designed for the asynchronous communication model can
operate at network speed, but unfortunately, they are rarely
deployed in practice due to their complexity and overhead,
and are mostly the focus of theoretical academic work.
Main contribution. In this paper we combine the best of both
approaches. We present ACE, a simple generic framework
for asynchronous boosting, which converts consensus (also
called agreement) algorithms designed according the leader-
based view-by-view paradigm in the partial synchrony model
into randomized fully asynchronous SMR solutions. ACE is
model agnostic – it has no model assumptions, and thus can
be applied to any leader-based protocol in the byzantine or
crash failure model. As a result, with ACE, a system designer
can benefit twofold. On the one hand, from the experience
gained in decades of leader-based view-by-view algorithm
design and engineered systems, and on the other hand, from
a robust asynchronous solution.
View-by-view paradigm. ACE is general and applicable to a
family of consensus leader-based view-by-view protocols de-
signed for the partially synchronous communication model [21,
37, 54]. Such protocols divide executions into a sequence of
views, each with a designated leader. Every view is then fur-
ther divided into two phases. First, the leader-based phase in
which the designated leader tries to drive progress by getting
all parties to commit its value. Then, when parties suspect
that the leader is faulty, whether it is really faulty or due to
1
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asynchrony or network attacks, they start the view-change
phase in which they exchange information to safely wedge
the current view and move to the next one.
Technical contribution. ACE’s first contribution is providing
a formal characterization of the leader-based view-by-view
protocols by defining a leader-based view (LBV) abstraction,
which encapsulates the core properties of a single view and
provides an API that allows de-coupling of the leader-based
phase from the view-change phase. In the view-by-view para-
digm, view-change phases are triggered with timers: parties
start a timer at the beginning of the leader-based phase in
each view and if the timer expires before the leader drives
progress, parties move to the view-change phase. Indeed, if
we instantiate the LBV abstraction with an implementation of
a view of some view-by-view protocol and operate a sequence
of these LBVs, each time invoking the leader-based phase,
then timeout, and then invoke the view-change phase, then
we end up with a variant of the view-by-view protocol that
the LBV is instantiated with. See illustration in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Using a sequence of LBV instances to reconstruct
a partially synchronous leader-based view-by-view protocol.
ACE’s second technical contribution is a novel wave mech-
anism to control the trigger of view-change phases. Rather
than using timers, the wave mechanism uses the API provided
by the LBV abstraction to generically rearrange views in view-
by-view protocols. The key idea is to compose several LBV
abstractions in a way that allows progress at network speed
during periods of asynchrony. This mechanism exploits a key
property shared by all view-by-view protocols: If the leader
of a view is correct and timers never expire, then eventually a
decision will be made in this view.
ACE’s single-shot agreement protocol proceeds in a wave-
by-wave manner, each wave operates as follows: Instead of
running one LBV instance (as view-by-view protocols do), a
wave runs n LBV instances (the leader-based phase) simul-
taneously, each with a distinct designated leader. Then, the
wave performs a barrier synchronization in which parties wait
until a quorum of the instances have reached a decision. Re-
call that by the key property, all instances with correct leaders
eventually decide so eventually the barrier is reached.
After the barrier is reached, one LBV instance is selected
unpredictably and uniformly at random. The chosen instance
“wins”, and all other instances are ignored. Then, parties use
the LBV’s API to invoke the view-change phase in the cho-
sen instance (only). The view-change phase here has two
purposes. First, it boosts termination. If the chosen instance
has reached a decision, meaning that a significantly large
quorum of parties decided, then all correct parties learn this
decision during the view-change phase. Second, as in every
view-by-view protocol, the view-change phase ensures safety
by forcing the leaders of the next wave to propose safe values.
The next wave enacts n new LBV instances, each with a
different leader that proposes a value according to the state
returned from the view-change phase of the chosen instance
of the previous wave. Note that since parties wait for a large
quorum of LBV instances to reach a decision in each wave
before randomly choosing one, the chosen LBV has a constant
probability of having a decision, hence, together with the
termination boosting provided by the view-change phase, we
get progress, in expectation, in a constant number of waves.
As to SMR, ACE implements a variant in which parties
do not proceed to the next slot before they learn the decision
value of the current one, but once they move to the next one
they stop participating in the current slot and garbage collect
all the associated resources. Deferring next slots until the
current decision is known is essential for systems in which
the validity of a value for a certain slot depends on all previous
decision values (e.g., Blockchains). ACE’s SMR solution uses
an instance of our single-shot protocol for every slot together
with a forwarding mechanism to help slow parties catch-up.
Applications. ACE can take any view-by-view consensus
protocol designed for the partially synchronous model and
transform it into an asynchronous SMR solution. In order to
instantiate ACE with a specific algorithm, e.g., PBFT [21]
or Paxos [37], one must take the core of the algorithm logic
(a single view) and wrap it with the LBV’s API that pro-
vides an engage method to start the leader-based phase and
a wedge&exchange method to proceed to the view-change
phase. We define the properties each LBV implementation
has to satisfy, and argue that all existing leader-based view-by-
view algorithms implicitly satisfy these properties. Therefore,
instantiating ACE does not require new logic implementa-
tion beyond the engineering effort of providing its API. Fur-
thermore, ACE’s modularity provides a clean separation of
concerns between the Safety (provided by the LBV proper-
ties) and asynchronous Liveness (provided by the framework).
With ACE, designing a new fully asynchronous SMR system
based on an existing partially synchronous consensus proto-
col or updating a deployed system with a novel agreement
protocol, only requires an LBV implementation.
An important feature of ACE is fairness. Due to the in-
herent unpredictable randomness in the election mechanism,
ACE provides an equal chance for all correct parties to drive
decisions during synchrony, and optimally bounds the prob-
ability to decide a value proposed by a correct party during
asynchrony. Another important feature of ACE is its model
agnostic, namely it does not add any model assumptions on
top of the assumptions made by the instantiated protocols.
As a result, when instantiated with a BFT protocol such as
PBFT [21] we get an asynchronous byzantine state machine
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replication, and when instantiated with a crash-failure solu-
tion like Paxos [37] or Raft [48] we get the first asynchronous
SMR system tolerating any minority of failures.
In order to make ACE model agnostic, we encapsulate the
barrier synchronization and the random election mechanisms
into abstractions as well, denoted barrier and leader-election
respectively, and define their properties. So that when instan-
tiating our framework, one need also provide implementation
of these abstractions for the assumed model. In Section 6 we
give an implementation example for the byzantine model.
Complexity and performance. To demonstrate ACE, we choose
to focus on the byzantine model as this is the model consid-
ered by Blockchain systems and we believe that, due to their
high stakes, Blockchain systems will benefit the most from a
generic asynchronous SMR solution that can tolerate network
attacks. We implement ACE’s algorithms in C++ and instan-
tiate the LBV abstraction with a variant of HotStuff [54] – a
state of the art BFT solution, which is currently being imple-
mented in several commercial Blockchain systems [7]. We
compare the ACE instantiation to the base (raw) HotStuff
implementation in different scenarios. Our evaluation shows
that while base HotStuff outperforms ACE (instantiated with
HotStuff) in the optimistic, synchronous, failure-free case,
ACE has absolute superiority during asynchronous periods
and network attacks. For example, we show that byzantine
parties can hinder progress in base HotStuff by targeting lead-
ers with a DDoS attack, whereas ACE manages to commit
values at network speed.
From a theoretical perspective, ACE generalizes the idea
in VABA [10], the first asymptotically optimal asynchronous
byzantine agreement protocol, and adds only factor n in com-
munication complexity over the leader-based phase in each
view of the protocol it is instantiated with. Therefore, since
no protocol can solve byzantine agreement with less than qua-
dratic communication [25], ACE can leverage protocols with
linear communication in the leader-based phases, like Hot-
Stuff [54], to reproduce the asymptotically optimal quadratic
asynchronous byzantine agreement solution of VABA [10].
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 describes the model and formalizes the agreement and
SMR problems. Section 3 gives an overview of the view-by-
view paradigm, capturing its core properties and vulnerabili-
ties. Section 4 defines ACE’s abstractions, and its algorithms
are given in Section 5. Section 6 instantiates ACE and evalu-
ates its performance. Finally, Section 7 discusses related work
and Section 8 concludes.
2 Model and Problem Definitions
Section 2.1 formally define the model and the Agreement and
SMR problems are defined in Section 2.2.
2.1 System Model
Communication. We consider a peer to peer system with n
parties, f < n of which may fail. We say that a party is faulty
if it fails at any time during an execution of a protocol. Other-
wise, we say it is correct. In a peer to peer system every pair
of parties is connected with a communication link. A message
sent on a link between two correct parties is guaranteed to be
delivered, whereas a message to or from a faulty party might
be lost. A link between two correct parties is asynchronous
if the delivery of a message may take arbitrary long time,
whereas a link between two correct parties is synchronous if
there is a bound ∆ for message deliveries. In asynchronous
network periods all links among correct parties are asynchro-
nous, whereas during synchronous network periods all such
links are synchronous.
A standard communication model assumed by algorithms
that follow the view-by-view paradigm is the partially syn-
chronous model1 [28]. In this model, there is an unknown
point in every execution, called global stabilization time
(GST), which divides the execution into two network peri-
ods: before GST the network is asynchronous and after GST
the network is synchronous. The partially synchronous model
was defined to capture spontaneous network disconnections in
wide-area networks, in which case it is reasonable to assume
that asynchronous periods are short and synchronous periods
are long enough for the protocols to make progress.
However, the partially synchronous model fails to capture
malicious attacks that intentionally try to sabotage progress,
and thus are not suitable for many current use cases (e.g.,
Blockchains). For example, one possible attack is the weakly
adaptive asynchronous in which an attacker adaptively blocks
one party at a time from sending or receiving messages (e.g.,
via DDOS). This results in a mobile asynchrony that moves
from party to party, violating the GST assumption made by
the partially synchronous model, and thus prevents progress
from all leader-based view-by-view algorithms.
ACE, in contrast, assumes the fully asynchronous commu-
nication model, and thus progress in network speed under all
network conditions and attacks as long as messages among
correct parties are eventually delivered.
Failures, cryptography, and cetera. As mentioned in the In-
troduction and explained in more detail below, ACE abstracts
away specific model assumptions and implementation de-
tails into three primitives: Leader based view (LBV), leader-
election, and barrier. In Section 4, we define the properties
of these primitives and require that any leader-based view-by-
view protocol that is instantiated into our framework satisfies
them. To satisfy these properties, each protocol may have
different model assumptions: for example, the relation be-
tween f and n, the type of failures that may occur (e.g., crash
and byzantine), and cryptographic assumptions. ACE inherits
1Sometimes referred as eventual synchrony in the literature.
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the specific assumptions made by each of the protocols it is
instantiated with, and adds nothing to them. In other words,
whatever assumptions are made by the instantiated protocol
in order to satisfy the abstractions’ properties, are exactly the
assumptions under which ACE operates.
2.2 Problem Definition
We now formally define the problems ACE implements. We
start with a fair validated single-shot agreement definition,
and then define the SMR problem which is a generalization
of the single shot agreement into a multi-shot problem.
Fair validated single-shot agreement. The fair validated agree-
ment [10, 17, 19] is single-shot problem in which correct par-
ties propose externally valid values and agree on one unique
such value. The formal properties are given below:
• Agreement: All correct parties that decide, decide on
the same value.
• Termination: If all correct parties propose valid values,
then all correct parties decide with probability 1.
• Validity: If a correct party decides an a value v, then v
is externally valid.
Note that the agreement and termination properties are not
enough by them self to guarantee real progress of any multi-
shot agreement system (e.g., Blockchain) that is built on top
of the single-shot problem. Without external validity, parties
are allowed to agree on some pre-defined value (i.e., ⊥) [45],
which is basically an agreement not to agree. Moreover, as
long as a value satisfies the system’s external validity con-
dition (e.g., no contradicting transactions in a blockchain
system), parties may decide on this value even if it was pro-
posed by a byzantine party. However, since high stake is
involved and byzantine parties may try to increase the ratio
of decision values proposed by them, we require an addi-
tional fairness property that is a generalization of the quality
property defined in [10]:
• Fairness: The probability for a correct party to decide
on a value proposed by a correct party is at least 1/2.
Moreover, during synchronous periods, all correct par-
ties have an equal probability of 1/n for their values to
be chosen.
Intuitively, note that by simply following the protocol byzan-
tine parties can have a probability of 1/3 (recall that 1/3 of
the parties are byzantine) for their value to be chosen in every
protocols even during synchronous periods. And since during
asynchronous periods the adversary can, in addition, block
1/3 of the correct parties, we get that byzantine parties can
increase their probability to 1/2. Meaning that the fairness
property we require is optimal.
Fair state machine replication. A state machine replication 2
(SMR) is a generalization of a single-shot agreement problem
2Sometime referred to as atomic broadcast [51]
into a multi-shot agreement system [37]. Informally, an SMR
system agrees on a (possibly infinite) sequence of valid values.
Formally, every correct party inputs with a (possible infinite)
sequence of externally valid values, and outputs a sequence
of tuples of the form ⟨sq,v⟩, where sq ∈ {1, . . . ,N } for an
arbitrary large N and v is an (externally valid) value. Note
that each output event contains exactly one such tuple, and in
in the rest of the paper we sometimes refer to the sequence
number sq as a slot number. An implementation of a fair SMR
must satisfies the following properties:
• Integrity: For every sq ∈ {1, . . . ,N }, a correct party
outputs at most one tuple ⟨sq,v⟩.
• Validity: For every sq ∈ {1, . . . ,N }, if a correct party
outputs a tuple ⟨sq,v⟩, then v is externally valid.
• Termination: For every sq ∈ {1, . . . ,N }, all correct
parties eventually output a tuple ⟨sq,v⟩ for some v
with probability 1.
• Agreement: For every sq ∈ {1, . . . ,N }, if two correct
parties output ⟨sq,v⟩ and ⟨sq,v ′⟩, then v = v ′.
• Fairness: For every sq ∈ {1, . . . ,N }, the probability for
a correct party to output ⟨sq,v⟩ s.t. v was proposed by
a correct party is at least 1/2.
In order to capture the requirements made by systems like
Blockchains in which the validity of a value proposed in slot
i depends on all the decision values from slots 1 to i − 1, we
add an additional property to our SMR definition:
• FIFO: For every sq ∈ {2, . . . ,N }, if a correct party p
outputs a tuple ⟨sq,v⟩ for some v, then for every 1 ≤
sq′ < sq p previously outputted ⟨sq′,v ′⟩ for some v ′.
Moreover, while from a theoretical point of view we usu-
ally only care about the total resources consumed by correct
parties up to the point when they all decide, ignoring the
resources used from this point on. From a practical point of
view, systems wish to garbage collect all resources allocated
for a specific slot immediately after a decision for this slot
has been made. Since it is not always straight forward to map
resources into slots in which they are consumed, we capture
the above by requiring following property:
• Strong halting: For any arbitrary large N , eventually all
resources are de-allocated.
Note that the standard way to achieve halting is by the so
called state transfer in which parties reliably broadcasts the
decision value of each slot to all parties before de-allocating
all the associated resources and moving to the next slot. This
approach requires quadratic communication and is the ap-
proach we take in this paper. Dolev and Strong [25] have
shown that even in a synchronous setting this quadratic com-
munication is unavoidable, so at least asymptotically, this
does not introduce a new overhead.
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3 The View-by-View Paradigm
Many (if not all) practical agreement and consensus algo-
rithms operate a leader-based view-by-view paradigm, de-
signed for partially synchronous models, including the semi-
nal work of Dwork et al. [28] pioneering the approach, and
underlying classical algorithms like Paxos [37], Viewstamped-
Replication [47], PBFT [21], and others [36, 48].
Protocols designed according to the view-by-view para-
digm advance in views. Every view has a designated leader
that proposes a value and tries to convince other parties to
decide on it. In order to tolerate faulty leaders from halt-
ing progress forever, parties use timers to measure leader
progress; if no progress is made they demote the leader, aban-
doning the current view and proceeding to the next one.
The main problem with this approach is that a faulty leader
that does not send any messages is indistinguishable from
a correct leader with asynchronous links. Therefore, proto-
cols implementing this approach are not able to guarantee
progress during asynchronous periods or weakly adaptive
asynchronous attacks since parties advance views before cor-
rect leaders are able to drive decisions.
3.1 Core properties
Safety. Perhaps the most important property of algorithms
designed according to the view-by-view paradigm is their
ability to satisfy safety during arbitrary long asynchronous
periods. This is achieved via a careful view-change mecha-
nism that governs the transition between views. View-change
consists of parties wedging the current view by abandoning
the current leader, and exchanging information about what
might have committed in the view (the closing state of the
view). In the new view, parties participate in the new leader’s
phase only if it proposes a value that is safe in accordance
with the closing state.
Liveness. Algorithms that rely on leaders to drive progress
cannot guarantee progress during asynchronous periods since
they cannot distinguish between faulty leaders and correct
ones with asynchronous links. During asynchronous periods,
messages from the current leader may be delivered only after
parties timeout and move to the next view regardless of how
conservative the timeouts are set.
However, all these algorithms share an important property
that our framework utilizes: for every view, if the leader of the
view is correct and no correct party times out and abandons
this view, then all correct parties decide in this view.
3.2 Practical Vulnerabilities
Deploying view-by-view algorithms requires tuning the leader
timeouts. On the one hand, aggressive timeouts set close to
the common network delay might cause correct leaders to be
demoted due to spurious delays, and destabilize the system.
On the other, conservative timeouts implies delayed actions in
case of faulty leaders. It further opens the system to possible
attacks by byzantine leaders that slow system progress to the
maximum possible without triggering a timeout.
Another attack on the progress of leader-based protocols
is the weak adaptive asynchrony in which an attacker blocks
communication with the leader of each view until the view
expires, e.g., via distributed denial-of-service attack. Last,
a carefully executed adaptive asynchrony attack can cause
a fairness bias. Some leaders (possibly byzantine) may be
allowed to progress and commit their values, whereas an at-
tacker blocks communication with other designated (possibly
all correct) leaders. In Section 6, we demonstrate the above
attacks, and show that ACE is resilient against them.
4 Framework abstractions
ACE provides “asynchronous boosting” for partially synchro-
nous protocols designed according to the leader-based view-
by-view paradigm. In a nutshell, ACE takes such a protocol,
encapsulates a single view of the protocol into a leader-based
view (LBV) abstraction that provides API to avoid timeouts,
composes LBVs into a wave of n instances running in parallel,
interjects auxiliary actions in between successive waves, and
chooses one LBV instance retrospectively at random. Detailed
description is given in the next section. Section 4.1 defines
the Leader based view (LBV) abstraction and Section 4.2
introduces auxiliary abstractions utilized by ACE.
4.1 Encapsulating view-based agreement protocols
As explained above, each view in a leader-based view-by-
view algorithm consists of two phases: First, all parties wait
for the leader to perform the leader-based phase to drive de-
cision on some value v, and then, if the leader fails to do it
fast enough, parties switch to the view-change phase in which
they wedge the current leader and exchange information in
order to get the closing state of the view. To decide when to
switch between the phases, existing algorithms use timeouts,
which prevent them from guaranteeing progress during asyn-
chronous periods. Therefore, in order to boost asynchronous
liveness, ACE replaces the timeout mechanism with a differ-
ent strategy to switch between the phases. To this end, the
LBV abstraction exposes an API with two methods, engage
and wedge&exchange, where engage starts the first phase
of the view (leader-based), and wedge&exchange switches
to the second (view-change). By exposing API with these
two methods, we remove the responsibility of deciding when
to switch between the phases from the view (e.g., no more
timeouts inside a view) and give it to the framework, while
still preserving all safety guarantees provided by each view
in a leader-based view-by-view protocol.
Every instance of the LBV abstraction is parametrized with
the leader’s name and with an identification id, which con-
tains information used by the high-level agreement algorithm
built (by the framework) on top of a composition of LBP
instances. The wedge&exchange method gets no parameters
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and returns a tuple ⟨s,v⟩, where v is either a value or ⊥;
and s is the closing state of the instance, which consists of
all the necessary information required by the specific imple-
mentation of the abstraction (e.g., a safe value for a leader
to propose and a validation function all parties use to check
if the proposed value is safe). The engage method gets the
“closing state” s that was returned from wedge&exchange in
the preceding LBV instance (or the initial state in case this is
the first one), and outputs a value v. Intuitively, the returned
value from both methods is the “decision” that was made in
the LBV instance, but as we explain below, the high-level
agreement algorithm might choose to ignore this value.
The safety of view-by-view algorithms strongly relies on
the fact that correct parties start a new view with the closing
state of the previous one. Otherwise, they cannot guarantee
that correct parties that decide in different views decide on
the same value. Therefore, when we encapsulate a single view
in our LBV abstraction and define its properties, we consider
only executions in which the LBV instances are composed
one after another. Formally, we say that the LBV abstractions
are properly composed by a party pi in an execution if pi
invokes the engage of the first instance with some fixed initial
state (which depends on the instantiated protocol), and for
every instance k > 1, pi invokes its engage with the state
output of wedge&exchange of instance k − 1. In addition, we
say that the LBV abstractions are properly composed in an
execution if they are properly composed by all correct parties.
Figure 2 illustrates LBV’s API and its properly composed
execution.
Figure 2. A properly composed execution: The engage
method of instance k > 1 gets the state output of the
wedge&exchange method of instance k − 1.
The formal definition of the LBV abstraction is as follows:
Definition 1. A protocol implements an LBV abstraction if
the following properties are satisfied in every properly com-
posed execution that consists of a sequence of LBV instances:
Liveness:
• Engage-Termination: For every instance with a cor-
rect leader, if all correct parties invoke engage and no
correct party invokes wedge&exchange, then engage
invocations by all correct parties eventually return.
• Wedge&Exchange-Termination: For every instance,
if all correct parties invoke wedge&exchange then all
wedge&exchange by correct parties eventually return.
Safety:
• Validity: For every instance, if an engage or
wedge&exchange invocation by a correct party returns
a value v, then v is externally valid.
• Completeness: For every instance, if f +1 engage invo-
cations by correct parties return, then nowedge&exchange
invocation by a correct party returns a value v = ⊥.
• Agreement: If an engage or wedge&exchange invoked
in some instance by a correct party returns a value
v , ⊥ and some other engage or wedge&exchange
invoked in some instance by a correct party returns
v ′ , ⊥ then v = v ′.
Note that during the view-change phase in most leader-
based protocols, parties send the closing state only to the
leader of the next view. However, in ACE, since we run n con-
current LBV instances, each with a different leader, we need
all parties to learn the closing state after wedge&exchange re-
turns. Moreover, as mentioned above and captured by the
Completeness property, we use wedge&exchange to also
boost decisions in order to guarantee that if the retrospec-
tively chosen LBV instance successfully completed the first
(leader-based) phase, than all correct parties decide at the
end of its second phase. Therefore, when encapsulating the
view-change mechanism of a leader-based protocol into the
wedge&exchange method, a small change has to be made in
order to satisfy the above properties. Instead of sending the
closing state only to the next leader, parties need to exchange
information by sending the closing state to all parties and wait
to receive n − f such messages. No change is needed to the
first phase of the encapsulated leader-based protocol since all
the required properties for engage are implicitly satisfied.
4.2 Auxiliary abstractions
We now define two additional abstractions required by ACE.
Similarly to the LBV abstraction, each instance is parametrized
with an identification id, and the implementation details and
model assumptions are abstracted away.
Barrier. The barrier abstraction is used to synchronize be-
tween parties, ensuring that correct parties wait for each other
before progressing. The abstraction exposes two API meth-
ods: barrier-ready and barrier-sync. Below we define the
properties each barrier implementation must satisfy:
Definition 2. An implementation of the Barrier abstraction
must satisfy the following properties:
• B-Coordination: No barrier-sync invocation by a cor-
rect party returns before f + 1 correct parties invoke
barrier-ready.
• B-Termination: If all correct parties invoke barrier-ready
then all barrier-sync invocations by correct parties
eventually return.
• B-Agreement: If some barrier-sync invocation by a
correct party returns, then all barrier-sync invocations
by correct parties eventually return.
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Leader-election. Our Leader-election abstraction is similar to
the one defined in [10], which exposes one operation, elect, to
elect a unique leader. The formal properties are given below.
Definition 3. An implementation of the Leader-election ab-
straction must satisfy the following properties:
• L-Termination: If f + 1 correct parties invoke elect,
then all elect invocations by correct parties return.
• L-Agreement: All invocations of elect by correct par-
ties that return, return the same party.
• L-Validity: If an invocation of elect by a correct party
returns, it returns a party pi with probability 1/n for
every pi ∈ {p1, . . . ,pn}.
• L-Unpredictability: The probability of the adversary
to predict the returned value of an elect invocation by
a correct party before any correct party invokes elect
is at most 1/n.
In Section 6 we give example implementations of these ab-
stractions in the byzantine failure model.
5 Framework algorithms
In this section we present ACE’s asynchronous boosting al-
gorithms, which are built on top of the abstractions defined
above. We first present in Section 5.1 an algorithm for an asyn-
chronous single-shot agreement, and then, in Section 5.2 we
show how to turn it into an asynchronous SMR. For complete-
ness, in Section 5.3, we show how to use the LBV abstraction
to reconstruct a variant of the base partially synchronous
view-by-view algorithm the LBV is instantiated with.
5.1 Asynchronous fair single-shot agreement
The pseudocode for the asynchronous single-shot agreement
protocol appears in Algorithm 1 and a formal correctness
proof is given in Section 5.1.1. An invocation of the protocol
(SS-propose(id, S)) gets an initial state S and identification
id, where the initial state S contains all the initial specific
information (including the proposed value) required by the
leader-based view-by-view protocol instantiated in the LBV
abstraction.
The protocol proceeds in a wave-by-wave manner. The
state is updated at the and of every wave and a decision is
made the first time a wave returns a non-empty value. In every
wave, each party first invokes the engage operation in n LBV
instances, each with a different leader. Each invocation gets
the state obtained at the end of the previous wave or the initial
state if this is the first wave.
Then, parties invoke barrier-sync and wait for it to return.
Recall that by the B-Coordination property, barrier-sync re-
turns only after f + 1 correct parties invoke barrier-ready.
When an engage invocation in an LBV instance with leader
pj returns, a correct party sends an “ENGAGE-DONE” mes-
sage to party pj , and whenever a party gets n − f such mes-
sages it invokes barrier-ready. Denote an LBV instance as
Algorithm 1 Asynchronous single-shot agreement.
1: upon SS-propose(id,S) do
2: state ← S ; wave ← 1
3: while true do
4: ID ← ⟨id, wave ⟩
5: ⟨state′, value ⟩ ← WAVE(ID, state)
6: if value , ⊥ and did not decide before then
7: decide ⟨id, value ⟩
8: state ← state′
9: wave ← wave + 1
10: procedure WAVE(ID, state)
11: for all pj = p1, . . . , pn do
12: invoke engage ⟨ID,pj ⟩(state) ▷ non-blocking
13: barrier-sync ID ()
14: leader ← electID ()
15: return wedge&exchange ⟨ID,leader ⟩()
16: upon engage ⟨ID,pj ⟩ returns v do
17: send “ID, ENGAGE-DONE” to party pj
18: upon receiving n − f “ID,ENGAGE-DONE” messages do
19: invoke barrier-ready ID ()
successfully completed when f + 1 correct parties completed
the first phase, i.e., their engage returned, and note, there-
fore, that a correct party invokes barrier-ready only after the
LBV instance in which it acts as the leader was successfully
completed. Thus, a barrier-sync invocation by a correct party
returns only after f +1 LBV instances successfully completed.
Figure 3. Asynchronous single-shot algorithm. The chosen
LBVs, which are marked in green, are properly composed.
Next, when the barrier-sync returns, parties elect a unique
leader via the leader-election abstraction, and further consider
only its LBV instance. Note that since parties wait until f + 1
LBV instances have successfully completed before electing
the leader, with a constant probability of f +1n the parties elect
a successfully completed instance3, and even an adaptive
adversary has no power to prevent it.
Finally, all parties invoke wedge&exchange in the elected
LBV instance to wedge and find out what happened in its
3This can be improved to 2f +1n in the byzantine case with n = 3f + 1 if
parties attach completeness proofs to barrier-ready messages.
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first phase, using the returned state for the next wave and
possibly receiving a decision value. By the Completeness
property of LBV, if a successfully completed LBV instance
is elected, then all wedge&exchange invocations by correct
parties return v , ⊥ and thus all correct parties decide v in
this wave. Therefore, after a small number of nf +1 waves all
correct parties decide in expectation. Note that the sequence
of chosen LBV instances form a properly composed execu-
tion, and thus since parties return only values returned from
chosen LBVs, our algorithm inherits its safety guarantees
from the leader-based protocol the LBV is instantiated with.
An illustration of the algorithm appears in Figure 3.
5.1.1 Correctness Proof
We prove that Algorithm 1 satisfies Agreement, Termination,
Validity, and Fairness properties in the asynchronous com-
munication model. We start by proving the Agreement and
Validity properties.
Observation 1. The chosen LBV instances in Algorithm 1
form a properly composed execution.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 1 satisfies Validity and Agreement.
Proof. By the code, correct parties only decide on values
returned from a wedge&exchange method invoked on one
of the chosen instances. Therefore, by Observation 1, the
Validity and Agreement properties follow from the Safety
properties required by the LBV abstraction.
□
We now prove that Algorithm 1 satisfies Termination. We
start by showing that no honest party is stuck forever in a
wave.
Claim 1. Consider a wave k ≥ 1 that all correct parties start,
then at least one barrier-sync invocation by a correct party
eventually returns.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that no barrier-sync
() invocations by correct party eventually returns in wave k.
Thus, no correct party ever invoke wedge&exchange in wave
k. Therefore, since all correct parties invoke engage in all
LBV instances in wave k , we get by the Engage-Termination
property that all propose invocation by correct parties even-
tually return, and thus all correct parties eventually send
ENGAGE-DONE messages to all correct leaders. Hence, all
correct leaders eventually get n− f ENGAGE-DONE messages,
and thus eventually invoke barrier-ready. The contradiction
follows from the B-Termination property.
□
Claim 2. For every wave k ≥ 1, if all correct parties start
wave k, then all correct parties eventually complete wave k.
Proof. By Claim 1, some barrier-sync invocation by a correct
party eventually returns in wave k . Thus, by the B-Agreement
property, all barrier-sync invocations by correct parties even-
tually return in wave k , and thus all correct parties eventually
invoke elect in wave k. By the L-Termination property, all
elect invocations by correct parties eventually return in wave
k . Therefore, the Claim follows from the Wedge&Exchange-
Termination property.
□
The next corollary follows by inductively applying Claim 2.
Corollary 1. For every k ≥ 1, all parties eventually complete
wave k in Algorithm 1.
For the rest of the proof we say that an LBV instance is
completed if at least f + 1 engage innovations by correct
parties previously returned. We next bound the probability to
choose a leader of a completed LBV instance.
Claim 3. For every wave k ≥ 1, at least f + 1 LBV instances
with correct leaders are completed before some correct party
invokes elect.
Proof. Consider some correct party that invokes elect at wave
k. By the code, its barrier-sync invocation was previously
returned, and thus by the B-Coordination property, at least f +
1 correct parties previously invoked barrier-ready. Therefore,
at least f + 1 correct parties received n − f ENGAGE-DONE
messages, at least f + 1 of which are from correct parties.
Since correct parties send ENGAGE-DONE messages to party
pj only after their engage invocation in the LBV instance in
which pj acts as leader returns, at least f + 1 LBV instances
with correct leaders are completed before some correct party
invokes elect.
□
Claim 4. Consider a wave k ≥ 1 that all parties start, the
probability for all correct parties to decide at wave k is at
least f +1n .
Proof. By Corollary 1, all correct parties invoke elect in view
k and, by the L-Agreement property, all invocations return
the same leader. By Claim 3, at least f + 1 LBV instances are
completed before some correct party invokes elect at view
k. Therefore, by the L-Validity and L-Unpredictability prop-
erties, we get that the probability to choose a leader of a
completed LBV instance is at least is f +1n . By the Complete-
ness property of the LBV abstraction, if a completed LBV
instance is chosen, then no wedge&exchange invocation by
correct party returnsv = ⊥. Therefore, by the code, all correct
parties decide at the end of wave k with probability f +1n .
□
Lemma 2. Algorithm 1 satisfies Termination.
Proof. By Corollary 1, correct parties are never stuck indefi-
nitely in any view, and thus all honest parties eventually start
all views. Therefore, by Claim 4, all honest parties eventually
8
ACE: Abstract Consensus Encapsulation Arxiv version, November 2019,
decide with probability 1. Moreover, the expected number of
views after which all correct party decide is nf +1 .
□
Lemma 3. Algorithm 1 satisfies Fairness.
Proof. By the Completeness property of the LBV abstraction,
if a completed instance is chosen, than all correct parties
decide at the end of the wave. By Claim 3, for every wave
k ≥ 1, at least f + 1 LBV instances with correct leaders are
completed before a unique instance is chosen in the wave.
Therefore, even if all LBV instances with faulty parties have
been completed as well, the probability to decide on value
proposed by a correct party is at least 1/2. Moreover, during
synchronous periods, all instances with correct parties com-
plete with equal probability, and thus by the L-validity, all
correct parties have an equal probability for their values to be
chosen.
□
5.2 Asynchronous fair state machine replication
The pseudocode for the asynchronous fair state machine repli-
cation appears in Algorithm 2. The parameter S , passed to the
SMR-propose invocation, is a vector consisting of an initial
state for each slot. We use an instance of the asynchronous
single-shot agreement to agree on the value of each slot, and
thus the SMR algorithm inherits the Integrity, Fairness, Va-
lidity and Agreement properties from the single-shot one. In
order to satisfy FIFO, parties do not advance to the next slot
until they learn the decision of the current one, and in order
to satisfy Halting they de-allocate all resources associated
with the current slot and abandon the slot’s single-shot algo-
rithm once they move. Note that abandoning a single-shot
algorithm might violate its Termination because it relies on
the participation of all correct parties. Therefore, to satisfy
the Termination of the SMR, we use a forwarding mechanism
to reliably broadcast the decision value before abandoning
the current slot and moving to the next one.
Since ACE is model agnostic, parties do not explicitly use
threshold signatures and decision proofs in the forwarding
mechanism. Instead, in every slot, correct parties waits un-
til they either decide on a value v (via the slot’s single-shot
agreement) or receive f + 1 “DECIDE” messages from parties
claiming they have decided on a value v. In the second case,
the receiving party knows that at least one correct party de-
cided v even in the byzantine failure model. Then, to make
sure that all correct parties eventually finish waiting even
though some might have moved to the next slot already, par-
ties use the barrier abstraction that provides the required guar-
antee with its B-Coordination property. Note that although
the above forwarding mechanism works for both byzantine
and crash failures models, in the latter case the forwarding
mechanism can be simplified: a party only needs to echo its
decision value before it moves to the next slot. So in this case,
the gray lines in the pseudocode can be dropped.
Algorithm 2 Asynchronous fair state machine replication.
1: upon SMR-propose(S) do
2: slot ← 0
3: for every s ∈ N do
4: M [s] ← {}
5: V [s] ← ⊥; D[s] ← false
6: while true do
7: slot ← slot + 1
8: SS-propose(slot, S [slot ])
9: wait until D[slot ] = true
10: send “slot, DECIDE, value” to all parties
11: barrier-ready slot ()
12: barrier-sync slot ()
13: free all resources associated with slot
14: output ⟨slot, V [slot ]⟩
15: upon decide ⟨slot, v ⟩ do
16: V [slot ] ← v ; D[slot ] ← true
17: upon receiving “slot, DECIDE, v” from party pj do
18: M [slot ] ← M [slot ] ∪ { ⟨pj , v ⟩ }
19: if ∃v s.t. | {p | ⟨p, v ⟩ ∈ M [slot ]} | = f + 1 then
20: V [slot ] ← v ; D[slot ] ← true
21:
5.3 Partially Synchronous view-by-view Agreement
For completeness, we show how to use the LBV abstraction
to reconstruct a variant of the leader-based view-by-view par-
tially synchronous base Agreement algorithm that the LBV
abstraction is instantiated with. To this end, we assume the
base algorithm provides two methods: getLeader and getTime-
out. These methods should implement the logic used by the
base algorithm to map designated leaders to views and set
their timeouts, respectively. In particular, getLeader(v) gets a
viewv and returns a party pi ∈ {p1 . . . ,pn}, and getTimeout(v,
S) gets a view v together with a state S and returns a timeout.
The pseudocode appears in Algorithm 3. The protocol
proceeds in views. Timeouts are used in order to demote a
leader who was unable to drive progress. At the beginning
of every view, parties first get the leader and the timeout of
the current view, and then invoke engage in the leaders LBV
instance and a timer to monitor the leaders progress. If the
engage invocation returns v before the timer expires, then v
is decided. In any case, whether the engage invocation returns
or the timer expires, a wedge&exchange is invoked in order
to update the state and safely proceed to the next view.
Note that the algorithm forms a properly composed execu-
tion of the LBV instances, and thus Validity and Agreement
are trivially satisfied by the Safety properties required by
the LBV abstraction. As any protocol in the partially syn-
chronous model, the termination of the algorithm requires a
long enough synchronous period in which all correct parties
execute the same view.
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Algorithm 3 Reconstruction of base partially synchronous
single-shot agreement: protocol for party pi .
1: upon ES-propose(id,S) do
2: state ← S ; view ← 1
3: while true do
4: leader ← GETLEADER(view )
5: timeout ← GETTIMEOUT(view, state)
6: invoke engage ⟨v iew, leader⟩(state)
7: invoke a timer to expire in t imeout
8: wait for timer to expire or engage to return
9: if engage returned v then
10: decide v
11: ⟨state, ∗⟩ ← wedge&exchange ⟨v iew, leader⟩()
12: view ← view + 1
6 ACE Instantiation
There are many possible ways to instantiate the ACE frame-
work. We choose to evaluate ACE in the byzantine failure
model with n = 3f +1 parties and a computationally bounded
adversary due to the attention it gets in the Blockchain use-
case. For the LBV abstraction, we implement a variant of Hot-
Stuff [54]. For the leader-election we implement the protocol
in [10, 19], and for the Barrier we give an implementation
that operates in the same model. All protocols use a BLS
threshold signatures schema [16] that requires a setup, which
can be done with the help of a trusted dealer or by using a
protocol for an asynchronous distributed key generation [35].
Our evaluation compares the performance of ACE’s SMR
instantiated with HotStuff, we refer to as ACE HotStuff, with
the base HotStuff SMR implementation. To compare ap-
ples to apples, the base HotStuff and ACE HotStuff share
as much code as possible. We present raw performance com-
parisons during synchronous periods, and demonstrate the
performance during asynchrony and under adversarial attacks.
We proceed to describe our implementation of the ACE
building blocks in Section 6.1, and in Section 6.2, we describe
the environmental setup and performance measurements.
6.1 Implementation
We implemented all algorithms in C++, and made use of a
BLS threshold signature [16] implementation provided in [3].
Communication is done over TCP to provide reliable links.
We next describe our LBV, barrier, and leader election imple-
mentations. The communication complexity of a single LBV
is linear and that of the barrier and leader-election is qua-
dratic, leading to an expected total quadratic communication,
for each slot.
LBV. The instantiation of the LBV abstraction is the four-
step view by view algorithm of HotStuff [54]. In the leader-
based phase of each view in HotStuff, a leader drives a de-
cision in four steps of communication s.t. in every step the
leader sends a signed message (with the proposed value) to
all parties, which in turn verify, sign, and send it back to the
leader. To ensure linear communication, the leader utilizes
threshold signatures [16] to provide concise proofs of a quo-
rum of signatures which are used for verification. If parties
timeout before the leader completes all four steps, they start
the view-change phase in which they send the closing state,
that consists of the messages they received in this view to the
leader of the next one.
To encapsulate the HotStuff protocol in the LBV abstrac-
tion we did the following: when a party invokes engage, it
begins participating in the leader’s four-step protocol as de-
scribed above, and whenever it gets the last step’s message, it
returns the value therein. To verify the safety of the first step
message, it uses the information in the state parameter passed
to engage. Note that if wedge&exchange is invoked before
engage returns, then engage never returns (wedge). In this
case, parties behaves as if their timeouts expired in the orig-
inal HotStuff with the following change: instead of sending
the closing state only to the next leader, parties send it to all
parties (exchange) since all parties act as leaders in the next
wave. When a party gets n − f such closing states, it updates
the state parameter accordingly and outputs it. In addition,
if at least one received closing states contains a valid four
step’s message, then the party also outputs the value therein.
Otherwise, it outputs ⊥. Note that we do not describe the
specific logic of the four-step protocol and the structure of the
state – an interested reader is referred for more details to [54].
Since the implementation keeps the safety logic of Hot-
Stuff, the Validity and Agreement of LBV are satisfied. Since
engage implements the HotStuff leader’s phase, then if the
leader is correct and no correct party invokewedge&exchange,
then eventually all parties get the leaders four step’s mes-
sage and return, thereby satisfying engage-Termination. The
wedge&exchange-Termination is satisfied since it returns af-
ter receiving n − f closing states. Af for Completeness, if an
engage invocation returns a value, than the invoking party
gets the four step’s message. Therefore, if f + 1 engage invo-
cation by correct parties return, then all correct parties gets
at least one closing state with the four step’s message during
wedge&exchange, and return a value v , ⊥.
Barrier. When a party invokes barrier-ready, it broadcasts a
message with its signature share for this barrier identification.
When a party invokes barrier-sync, it waits for the first of
the following two events. If it receives 2f + 1 valid shares,
it combines the shares into a threshold signature, sends it to
all other parties, and returns. If it receives a correct threshold
signature, it forwards it to all other parties and returns.
Since a barrier-sync invocation does not return before re-
ceiving 2f + 1 shares, then at least f + 1 correct parties previ-
ously invoked barrier-ready, thus satisfying B-Coordination.
B-Termination is satisfied since if all correct parties send
shares to all other parties, then every correct party receives
2f + 1 shares, and can generate a valid threshold signature.
Due to the forwarding of threshold signatures, if one correct
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party gets a threshold signature and returns, then all correct
parities eventually get it and return, satisfying B-Agreement.
Leader-election. The leader election is similar to that of [10]
and [19]. When a party invokes elect, it signs the instance’s
identification and broadcasts its share. When a correct party
collects f + 1 valid shares, it combines them to a threshold
signature, hashes the signature to get a pseudo random value,
and returns the value modulo n to get a random leader.
As the threshold signature is generated from f + 1 valid
shares, all correct parties eventually generate it provided
that at least f + 1 correct parties invoke elect, satisfying
L-Termination. Due to the nature of threshold cryptography,
the generated threshold signature is the same for all correct
parties [16], and since the hash and modulo functions are
deterministic, all parties agree on the electing leader, satis-
fying L-Agreement. For formal analysis of L-Validity and
L-Unpredictability please refer to [10, 18, 19].
6.2 Evaluation
We compare the SMR of ACE HotStuff with that of base
HotStuff. In Section 6.2.1 we present the tests’ setup. Then, in
Section 6.2.2, we measure ACE’s overhead during failure-free
synchronous periods, and in Section 6.2.3 we demonstrate
ACE’s superiority during asynchrony and attacks.
6.2.1 Setup
We conducted our experiments using c5d.4xlarge instances
on AWS EC2 machines in the same data center. We used
between 1 and 16 virtual machines, each with 4 replicas. The
duration of every test was 60 seconds, and every test was
repeated 10 times. The size of the proposed values is 10000
bytes. The latency is measured starting from when a new
slot has begun until a decision is made. The throughput is
measured in one of two ways. In tests where we altered the
number of replicas, the throughout is the total number of bytes
committed, divided by the length of the test. In tests where
we show the throughout as a function of time, we aggregate
the number of committed bytes in 1 second intervals. We did
not throttle the bandwidth in any run, rather we altered the
transmission delays between the machines, using NetEm [8].
6.2.2 ACE’s overhead
The first set of tests compare ACE HotStuff performance with
that of base HotStuff under optimistic, synchronous, faultless
conditions. Figure 4 depicts the latency and throughput. The
delay on the links was measured to be under 1ms. The latency
increases with the growth in the number of replicas since each
replica must handle an equal growth in the number of mes-
sages. Furthermore, as ACE HotStuff has a larger overhead
than base HotStuff, the latency grows faster.
Figure 5 shows the latency and throughput with different de-
lays added to the links. The latency of ACE HotStuff is twice
that of base HotStuff. This is expected, as ACE is expected to
execute 1.5 waves per slot, leading to 1.5x the latency. Add
on the additional barrier, leader election abstraction and we
arrive at 2x reduction in performance.
These tests show that the cost of using ACE is about 2x
reduction in performance in the optimistic case. In the next
tests we argue this cost is sometimes worth paying, as liveness
of partially synchronous algorithms can be easily affected.
(a) Latency (b) Throughput
Figure 4. Optimistic case with no network delay.
(a) Latency (b) Throughput
Figure 5. Optimistic case under different network delays.
6.2.3 ACE’s superiority
From here on we choose a configuration of 32 replicas and set
the transmission delay to be 5ms unless specified otherwise.
The second set of tests compare ACE HotStuff and base
HotStuff in adverse conditions concerning message delays.
These tests manipulate two factors, the transmission delays
(controlled via NetEm [8]), and the view timeout strategy.
Periods of asynchrony. The first test sets base HotStuff view
timers to a fixed constant of 100ms, the time needed for a
commit assuming a 5ms transmission delay. The test mea-
sures the performance drop during a short period in which
transmission delays are increased, simulating asynchrony. For
the first third of the test the network delay is 5ms, for the next
third the delay is 10ms, and finally the delay returns to 5ms.
Figure 6 compares the throughput of ACE HotStuff and
base HotStuff. While the network delay is 5ms, base HotStuff
outperforms ACE HotStuff. However, once the network delay
begins to fluctuate, the throughput of base HotStuff goes to
0 since no leader has enough time to drive progress. ACE
HotStuff only sees a drop in throughput proportional to the
delay, meaning that it continue to progress at network speed.
Weak adaptive asynchrony attack. Note that since the views
in base HotStuff are leader-based, byzantine parties (or any
other adversarial entity) can achieve the same “asynchronous”
11
Arxiv version, November 2019, Alexander Spiegelman and Arik Rinberg
Figure 6. Throughput
with a fluctuating
transmission delay.
Figure 7. Throughput
under DDoS attack.
effect presented above by only slowing down the leaders. In
the next test we demonstrate the above using a distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attack, in which leaders are flooded
with superfluous requests in an attempt to overload them and
delay their progress in the leader-based phase.
Figure 7 compares the throughput of ACE HotStuff and
base HotStuff, where the attack starts at the halfway mark
of the test. The byzantine parties coordinate their attack by
adaptively choosing a single correct party and flooding it
with superfluous requests. In base HotStuff, byzantine parties
target correct leaders (byzantine leaders are making progress).
In ACE HotStuff, there is no designated leader, therefore the
byzantine parties choose an arbitrary correct party to attack.
Our logs show that in base HotStuff progress is mainly made
in views where byzantines parties are leaders. If they would
not drive progress, the throughput would drop near 0.
Long conservative timeouts. The previous two scenarios op-
erated base HotStuff with a fixed aggressive view timer, which
was based on the expected network delay. This caused prema-
ture timer expiration during periods of increased delays (due
to asynchrony or attacks). One might think that a possible so-
lution can be to set a very long timeouts that will never expire,
thus letting the base HotStuff protocol progress in network
speed. However, the downside of conservative timers is that
byzantine parties can perform a silent attack on the protocol’s
progress by not driving views when they are leaders, forcing
all parties to wait for the long timeouts to expire.
The next test evaluates base HotStuff with a conservative
view timer of 1 second, fixed to be much higher than expected
needed to commit a view, under the silent attack starting at
the half way mark. Figure 8 presents the results. Before the
attack, base HotStuff indeed progresses in network speed, but
during the attack, the throughput drops significantly since
a few consecutive byzantine leader might stall progress for
seconds. In ACE HotStuff we see a much smaller drop, but
more fluctuation. This is due to the fact that byzantine leaders
Figure 8. Throughput
with conservative
timeouts under
byzantine silence
attack.
Figure 9. Throughput
with adjusting time-
outs under a combina-
tion of DDoS and si-
lence attacks.
do not drive progress in their LBV instances, and thus the
expected number of waves until a decision is now higher.
Adjusting timeouts. As the scenarios above demonstrate, nei-
ther being too aggressive nor being too conservative works
well for base HotStuff during asynchrony or attacks. There-
fore, in practice, when HotStuff is deployed it typically ad-
justs timers during execution according to progress or lack of
it. The most common method (used also by PBFT [21] and
SBFT [32]) is to increase timeouts whenever timers expires
too early, and decrease them whenever progress is made in or-
der to try to learn the network delay and adapt to it’s dynamic
changes. To test this method, we implement an adaptive ver-
sion, starting with a delay of t . If a timeout is reached in a
view before a decision is made we set the next view’s timeout
to 1.25t . Otherwise, the next view’s timeout is set to 0.8t .
We evaluate this method against the following attack that
combines insights from the previous ones. The results are
shown in Figure 9. In the second half of the experiment, byzan-
tine parties perform a DDoS attack on correct leaders, causing
the view timers to increase, and then perform the silence at-
tack (in views they act as leaders) to stall progress as much
as possible. As expected, base HotStuff throughput drops to
almost zero, whereas ACE HotStuff continues driving deci-
sions. Same as in the previous test, ACE HotStuff suffers
from fluctuation due to the probability to choose a byzantine
leader that did not made progress in its LBV instance. An-
other interesting phenomenon is the x2 performance drop of
base HotStuff before the attack begins compared to previous
tests. This is due to the timeout adjustment mechanism, which
reduces the timers after every successful view, resulting in a
too short timeout in every second view.
While the timer adjustment algorithm can be further en-
hanced, it is an arms race against the adversary – for each
method, there is an adversarial response. In addition, although
this evaluation is focused on HotStuff, the only ingredient of
the algorithm that is under attack is the timeout, hence the
evaluation exemplifies the weakness of all leader-based view
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by view algorithms. Therefore, our evaluation suggests that
the overhead of ACE in the optimistic case is worth paying
when high availability is desired under all circumstances.
7 Related work
The agreement problem was first introduced by Pease et
al. [49] almost 40 years ago, and has received an enormous
amount of attention since then [9, 11–13, 20–22, 26, 30, 36,
41–44, 53]. One of the most important results is the FLP [29]
impossibility, proving that deterministic solutions in the asyn-
chronous communication models are impossible. Below we
describe work that was done to circumvent the FLP impossi-
bility, present two related frameworks that were previously
proposed for the agreement problem, compare our SMR defi-
nition to other systems in the literature, and discuss alternative
fairness definitions.
Agreement in the partial synchrony model. A practical ap-
proach to circumvent the FLP impossibility is to consider the
partial synchrony communication model [32, 36, 47, 48, 54],
which was first proposed by Dwork et al. [28] and later used
by seminal works like Paxos [37] and PBFT [21]. As ex-
plained in detail in Section 3, protocols designed for this
model never violate safety, but provide progress only during
long enough synchronous periods. Despite their limitations,
they are widely adopted in the industry due to their relative
simplicity compared to the alternatives and their performance
benefits during synchronous periods. For example, Casan-
dra [1], Zookeeper [2], and Google’s Spanner [23] imple-
ment a variant of Paxos [37], and VMware’s Concord [4],
Facebook’s Libra [7] and IBM’s Hyperledger [6], implement
SBFT [32], HotStuff [54] and PBFT [21], respectively.
Agreement in the asynchrony model. As first shown by Ben-
Or [14] and Rabin [39], the FLP impossibility result does not
stand randomization. Meaning that the randomized version
of the Agreement problem, which guarantees termination
with probability 1, can be solved in the asynchronous model
provided that parties can flip random coins. The algorithms
in [14, 39] are very inefficient in terms of time and message
complexity, and there has been a huge effort to improve it over
the years. Some considered the theoretical full information
model, in which the adversary is computationally unbounded,
and showed more efficient algorithms that relax the failure
resilience threshold [33, 34]. These are beautiful theoretical
results but too complex to implement and maintain.
A more practical model for randomized asynchronous
agreement is the random oracle model in which the adversary
is computationally bounded and cryptographic assumptions
(like the Decisional Diffie–Hellman [24]) are valid. In the con-
text of distributed computing, this model was first proposed
by Cachin et al. [17, 19]. In [17] they proposed an almost op-
timal algorithm for the agreement problem. A variant of this
algorithm was later implemented in Honeybadger [44] and
Beat [27], which are the first academic asynchronous SMR
systems. The protocol in [17] is optimal in terms of resilience
to failures and round complexity, but has an inefficient O(n3)
communication cost. Improving the communication cost was
an open problem for almost 20 years, until it was recently
resolved in VABA [10]. ACE borrows a lot from VABA [10].
In fact, ACE can be seen as a generalization of the approach
introduced in VABA of letting n parties progress in parallel
and then retrospectively choosing one.
Frameworks for agreement. There are two previously pro-
posed agreement frameworks [31, 38] that we are aware of.
The next 700BFT [31] framework proposes an approach
to compose different byzantine SMRs. They observed that
no byzantine SMR can outperform all others under all cir-
cumstances, and introduce a general way for a system de-
signer to switch between implementations whenever the set-
ting changes. They defined Abstract, which is an abortable
SMR abstraction, that captures the progress and safety re-
quirements from a partially synchronous SMR, and provides
guidance on how multiple Abstract instances should be com-
posed. Our work is very different from theirs. While they
defined an abstraction in order to compose different SMR
view-by-view implementations to achieve better performance
in the partially synchronous model, our LBV abstraction pro-
vides an API to decouple the leader-based phase from the
view-change phase in each view, which in turn allows us to
compose LBV instances in a novel way that avoids leader
demotions via timeouts and boost liveness in asynchronous
networks.
Vertical Paxos [38] is a class of consensus algorithms that
separates the mechanism for reaching agreement from the
one that deals with failures. The idea is to use a fast and
small quorum of parties to drive agreement, and have an
auxiliary reconfiguration master to reconfigure this quorum
whenever progress stalls. The protocol for agreement relies
on the participation of all parties in the dedicated quorum, and
thus stalls whenever some party fails. The master is emulated
by a bigger quorum, which uses an agreement protocol to
agree on reconfiguration, and thus can tolerate failures.
State machine replication. Paxos [37] (crash-failure model)
and PBFT [21] (byzantine model) were the first to show how
to build an SMR from a single-shot agreement problem. In
both cases, similarly to ACE, parties use a single-shot agree-
ment instance to agree on the value of every slot, but contrary
to our algorithm, they do not satisfy the FIFO property since
they do not make sure all parties learn the decision value
before moving to the next slot. For some applications, e.g.,
Blockchains, this can be crucial since the validity of a value
sometimes depends on decision values of previous slots [46].
Moreover, for practical reasons, systems implementing the
Paxos and PBFT algorithms use periodic checkpoints [4, 7,
15], in which parties exchange all the decision values made
since the last checkpoint in order to free resources associated
13
Arxiv version, November 2019, Alexander Spiegelman and Arik Rinberg
with these slots. The cost of these checkpoints is quadratic in
the number of decision values and since better than quadratic
communication per decision is impossible [25] we decide
to avoid these checkpoints. Instead, we formally define the
FIFO and Strong halting properties and perform a quadratic
forwarding mechanism after each slot. It is important to note
that this is a design choice; ACE’s abstractions can be used
in a similar way to build SMR with different guarantees.
Fairness. Although the Agreement and SMR problems have
been studied for many years, the question of fairness therein
was only recently asked, and we are aware of only few solu-
tions that provide some notion of it [10, 12, 40, 44]. Prime [12]
extends PBFT [21] to guarantee that values are committed
in a bounded number of slots after they first proposed, and
FairLedger [40] uses batching to ensures that all correct party
commits a value in every batch. However, in contrast to ACE,
both protocols are able to guarantee fairness only during syn-
chronous periods. Honeybadger [44] is an asynchronous pro-
tocol that, similarly to FairLedger, batches values proposed
by different parties and commits them together atomically. It
probabilistically bounds the number of epochs (and accord-
ingly the number of slots) until a value is committed, after
being submitted to n − f parties. The VABA [10] protocol
does not use batching, and provides a per slot guarantee that
bounds the probability to choose a value proposed by a cor-
rect party during asynchronous periods. ACE provides similar
fairness guarantees during asynchrony, but also guarantees
equal chance for each correct party during synchrony.
8 Discussion
In this paper we introduced ACE: a general model agnostic
framework for boosting asynchronous liveness of any leader-
based SMR system designed for the partially synchronous
model. The main ingredient is the novel LBV abstraction
that encapsulates the properties of a single view in leader-
based view-by-view algorithms, while providing an API to
control the scheduler of the two phases, leader-based and
view-change, in each view. Exploiting this separation, ACE
provides a novel algorithm that composes LBV instances in a
way that avoids timers and provides a randomized asynchro-
nous SMR solution.
ACE is model agnostic, meaning that it does not add any
assumptions on top of what are assumed in the instantiated
LBV implementation, thus provides a generic liveness boost-
ing for both byzantine and crash-failure SMRs. In order to
instantiate ACE with a specific SMR algorithm, all a system
designer needs to do is alter the code of a single view to sup-
port LBV’s API; this should not be too complicated as the
view logic must already implicitly satisfy the required API’s
properties.
In addition to boosting liveness, ACE is designed in a way
that inherently provides fairness due to its randomized elec-
tion of leaders in retrospect. Moreover, ACE provides a clear
separation between safety, which relies on the LBV imple-
mentation, and liveness, which is given by the framework. As
a result, a system designer that chooses to instantiate ACE
gets a modular SMR implementation that is easier to prove
correct and maintain – if a better agreement protocol is pub-
lished, all the designer needs to do in order to integrate it in
the system is to alter the LBV implementation accordingly.
To demonstrate the power of ACE we implemented it, in-
stantiated it with the state of the art HotStuff [54] protocol,
and compared its performance to the base HotStuff implemen-
tation. Our results show that while ACE suffers a 2x perfor-
mance degradation in the optimistic, synchronous, failure-free
case, it enjoys absolute superiority during asynchronous peri-
ods and network attacks.
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